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5611 CASE NOTES 561 
approach of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.G7 Alterna- 
tively, the court could follow the Uniform Rules of Criminal Proce- 
dure and allow defendants to take depositions without court 
0rder.~8 The Uniform Rules contain some protection for both the 
prosecution and the defense, and the court could devise further 
protections if such appeared necessary. A third "middle ground" 
alternative adopted by some states is to allow discovery depositions 
only on court order.69 
Whatever alternative the court may select can only be superior to  
the present scheme of rule 8 l(e).  That scheme all too easily leads, as 
the Nielsen case demonstrates, to artificial construction or even 
misconstruction of statute and rule and to an ad hoc creation of rules 
of criminal procedure. 
Torts-ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE-A NEW RATIONALE FOR REFUSING TO 
EXTEND LIABILITY FOR INJURIES CAUSED BY NATURAL CONDITIONS- 
Loney u. McPhillips, 268 Or. 378, 521 P.2d 340 (1974) .  
The attractive nuisance doctrine has not generally been applied to 
injuries arising from natural conditions on pr0perty.l For some time, 
however, commentators have urged that liability be applied regard- 
less of the origin of the ~ o n d i t i o n . ~  They have argued that all cases 
to date denying attractive nuisance liability for natural conditions 
have involved hazards which the child should have unde r~ tood ,~  and 
that in the great majority of instances the burden on the landowner 
of removing the hazard would be exce~sive.~ The claim is that should 
a case arise in which the child does not understand the condition and 
in which the burden on the landowner of protecting the child is 
relatively light, there is no valid reason why liability should not be 
 FED. R. CRIM. P. 15. See note 22 s u p a .  
68See note 21 supra. 
69See note 21 s u p a .  
lSee, e.g., 2 F .  HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 5 27.5, at 1452 (1956); W. 
PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 5 59, at 367 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER] ; 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 339, comment p (1965); Prosser, Trespassing Chil- 
dren, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 427, 446 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Trespassing Children] ; 
2 OKLA. L. REV. 537,537-38 (1949). 
2See, e.g., PROSSER 8 59, at 367; Trespassing Children 446; Note, Trespassing Children: 
A Study in Expanding Liability, 20 VAND. L. REV. 139, 150 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 
Expanding Liability] ; 2 OKLA. L. REV. 537,538 (1949). 
~PROSSER 5 59, at 367; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 339, comment p (1965); 
Trespassing Children 446. 
4 R ~ S ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  (SECOND) OF TORTS 5 339, Comment p (1965); Trespassing Children 
446. 
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extended. Loney u. McPhillips6 presented such a case. Nevertheless, 
the Oregon Supreme Court refused to extend attractive nuisance 
liability to natural conditions in that case, and in so doing relied upon 
a public policy that is unique to the controversy.7 
In Loney  u. MePhillips plaintiff brought an action under the 
attractive nuisance doctrine for the wrongful death of his 13-year-old 
son. He alleged that defendant owned a stretch of beach along the 
Pacific Ocean known as Cape Kiwanda. The beach was within view of 
a public highway, offered an excellent view of the ocean, and people 
often trespassed there. Plaintiff's son was trespassing at the cape with 
friends when he was unexpectedly swept into the sea and drowned. 
Plaintiff alleged that because of the tides, the wind, and the peculiar 
formation of a cove, the cape was particularly hazardous to  specta- 
tors at high tide, and that the children, because of their youth and 
inexperience, were unable to recognize this danger. He sought to 
hold the defendant liable because of his knowledge of the danger of 
the cape, his awareness of frequent child trespasses, and because the 
danger could have been averted at little expense by putting up a 
fence or a sign.8 
The public policy relied upon by the Oregon court in Loney was a 
legislatively declared one of keeping privately owned wild lands open 
for recreational use. The purpose of this case note is to evaluate the 
strength of that public policy as a reason for not extending attractive 
nuisance liability to natural hazards. Only the Oregon court's con- 
tribution to this controversy will be considered. No attempt will be 
made to resolve the broad question of whether attractive nuisance 
liability should in all cases be extended to natural hazards. Never- 
theless,' in order to put the Loney decision in perspective, the devel- 
opment of the attractive nuisance doctrine since its inception in 
Sioux City & Pacific Railroad Co. u. Stoutg  will be traced, and some 
of the reasons for extending attractive nuisance liability to natural 
hazards will be considered. 
Before the Stout  case, a landowner generally owed no duty of care 
to trespassers except to refrain from wilfully or wantonly injuring 
VROSSER § 59, at 367; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339, comment p (1965); 
Trespassing Children 446-47. 
'268 Or. 378,521 P.2d 340 (1974). 
'The Oregon Court relied upon a legislatively declared public policy of encouraging 
private landowners to allow intruders onto their property for outdoor recreational 
purposes. Loney v. McPhillips, 268 Or. 378, 384-88, 521 P.2d 340, 343-44 (1974). Ap- 
parently such a policy has not been considered by the major text writers. No men- 
tion of it is made by Dean Prosser or by Professors Harper and James in their treatises. 
See 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 5 27.5 (1956); PROSSER 3 59. Nor does 
consideration seem to have been given it by the authors of the Restatement (Second). 
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Reporter's Notes $339, caveat at 135 (1966). 
8268 Or. at 37%80,521 P.2d at 340-41. 
984 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873). 
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them.1° In Stout, apparently for the first time,ll the defendant was 
held to a general negligence standard to trespassing children.12 The 
court considered five elements in determining whether he had exer- 
cised reasonable care: (1) the nature of the condition, (2) the like- 
lihood of the trespass, (3) the possibility of injury, (4) the utility of 
the condition to the landowner, and (5) the burden of removing it. 13 
What the Stout case did not do was give any rationale for treating 
child trespassers differently from other trespassers.14 
To justify a higher standard of care to the infant intruder, the 
courts developed an implied invitation theory.15 If it could be shown 
that the child had been lured onto the property by an attractive, 
dangerous condition created by the landowner, the courts held that 
he had in effect extended an invitation to the child. The child thus 
went upon his property as an invitee, to whom a duty of reasonable 
care was owed.16 
This rationale was difficult to apply and led to  a departure from 
the general negligence rule of Stout.17 First, since almost every 
condition could hold some attraction to a small child, it was difficult 
to determine which ones were attractive enough to  make the land- 
owner liable.18 Second, anomalies arose when an injured child was 
not attracted onto the property by any condition,lg or was attracted 
by a condition other than the one that injured him.20 Thus, if the child 
had not been lured onto the property by an "attractive nuisance," it 
was entirely possible for a landowner to be free of liability even 
though the trespass and subsequent injury to the child were fore- 
seeable and the defect easily remedied. 
Courts also recognized that even if the child were attracted onto 
the property by the dangerous object, there should be no liability if 
the child understood and appreciated the danger. 21 In applying this 
general principle, the courts created a class of conditions to which 
l0See, e.g., PROS~ER 5 58, at 357; Expanding Liability 140; 26 IND. L. J. 266,267 (1951). 
llExpanding Liability 141. 
1284 U.S. (17 Wall.) at  661; Expanding Liability 141. 
In  Stout a young boy was injured while playing on a railroad turntable on de- 
fendant's right-of-way. The railroad personnel had seen the children playing on the 
turntable, and the turntable could have been rendered harmless to the children at 
little expense by latching it in place. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) at  657-59,662. 
I384 U.S. (17 Wall.) at  661-62; Expanding Liability 146. 
14See Expanding Liability 141. 
15See Expanding Liability 142; 26 IND. L.J. 266,267 (1951). 
16See note 15 supra. 
17See Note, Liability Resulting From Artificial Bodies of Water, 48 IOWA L. REV. 939, 
9 U 2  (1963) [hereinafter cited as Artificial Bodies of Water] . 
l8See Banker v. McLaughlin, 146 Tex. 434, 455, 458-59, 208 S.W.2d 843, 855, 857-58 
(1948) (dissenting opinion). 
IgSee, e.g., United Zinc & Chem. Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268 (1922); 26 IND. L.J. 266, 268 
(1951). 
20See, e.g., Holstine v. Director General of Railroads, 77 Ind. App. 582, 591, 134 N.E. 
303,306 (1922); 26 IND. L.J. 266,268 n.l l  (1951). 
21 Trespassing Children 455-57. 
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the attractive nuisance doctrine would not apply no matter how 
attractive or dangerous they were. Children, no matter how young, 
were deemed, as a matter of law, to understand natural hazards and 
artificial conditions that were duplicative of nature, such as fire, 
water, heights, and  excavation^.^^ This was known in many states as 
the common hazard excepti0n.~3 
The weaknesses of the attractive nuisance doctrine with its implied 
invitation rationale and common hazard exception soon became 
apparent, and scholars began suggesting alternative theories to justify 
the higher duty to trespassing children. Professor Leon Green sug- 
gested that the voluntary erection of artificial structures on property 
automatically gives rise to the legal duty of taking reasonable pre- 
cautions to prevent injury to trespassing children.24 The different 
standard arises because the landowner voluntarily creates conditions 
on his property that might prove dangerous to children whose tres- 
pass he should have anti~ipated.2~ Other scholars suggested that the 
duty of reasonable care could be justified by recognizing society's 
interest in the safety of small ~hildren.~6 It is neither practical nor 
desirable to expect parents to follow small children around or tie 
them to a bedp0st.~7 Under these circumstances, the person often 
best situated to make certain that children are reasonably safe is the 
landowner upon whose land they trespass. 28 Finally, the imposition 
of a general negligence standard was urged on the ground that it was 
the best mechanism to balance the competing social interests in the 
safety of small children and the free use of private property.29 These 
views had a significant influence on the formulation of the rule 
finally adopted in section 339 of the Restatement of Torts.30 
221d. at 456-57. 
23See Pocholec v. Giustina, 224 Or. 245,257,355 P.2d llO4,lllO (1960). 
24Green, Landowner v. Intruder; Intruder v. Landowner. Basis of Responsibility in 
Tort, 21 M I C H .  L. REV. 495,514-16 (1923). 
25Zd. 
Green argues that when one voluntarily undertakes certain activities, he is required 
by the policy of the law to assume certain affirmative duties with respect to how he 
carries out those activities. One who manufactures automobiles assumes an affirmative 
duty to inspect them to be certain they are safe. Manufacture of less dangerous prod- 
ucts carries with it a lesser duty of inspection. Likewise, a landowner's duty of care to 
those coming onto his property innocently (Green refers to children as innocent tres- 
passers because of their inability to appreciate the wrong in going onto another's 
property. Id. at 512.) varies with the danger of use to which he has put his property. 
Id. at 513-15. 
26See Trespassing Children 429; Expanding Liability 14344. 
27 Trespassing Children 429. 
28Zd. 
29Hudson, The Turntable Cases in the Federal Courts, 36 HARV. L. ]REV. 495 (1923) 
[hereinafter cited as Hudson]. 
30See PROSSER § 59, at 366 n.45; Trespassing Children 431. 
Hudson suggested several items that he thought should be considered in the balanc- 
ing process, and his suggestions correspond closely to the criteria of RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS 5 339. Among the elements he suggested in determining whether the landownx 
exercised due care were the foreseeability of the child's trespass, the use being made of 
the land, the nature of the structure or condition, and the degree of danger. Hudson 
845,851-52. See note 31 infra. 
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The RestatemenP1 abandoned the "implied invitation" theory. 3 2  
Under section 339 liability was based on general negligence prin- 
ciples.33 The attractiveness of the condition was only one element to 
be considered in determining the foreseeability of the trespass, not a 
necessity for the imposition of liability.34 Further, the Restatement 
expressed no common hazard exception for artificial conditions. 35 
In all cases involving artificial structures, courts were to consider 
whether the child actually understood the danger of the condition. 36 
Though the Restatement established a rule of reasonable care 
under all the circumstances, even those courts which adopted it still 
maintained an exception for certain artificial ~onditions.3~ In the 
late 1950's this practice finally began to break down when the 
California Supreme Court declared in King v. Lenner~3~ that it would 
no longer exempt any class of conditions from application of section 
339.39 The inquiry in every case was to be whether the child ac- 
tually understood the h a ~ a r d . 4 ~  Other courts, likewise influenced by 
the Restatement, have abandoned the common hazard exception at 
least as to artificial conditions, and the trend is away from the 
categorization of conditions and toward a standard of reasonable 
care under all the  circumstance^.^^ 
3 1 R ~ S ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  OF TORTS 3 339 (1934) provides for liability to child trespassers under 
the following criteria: 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young children tres- 
passing thereon caused by a structure or other artificial condition which he main- 
tains upon the land, if 
(a) the place where the condition is maintained is one upon which the possessor 
knows or should know that such children are likely to trespass, and 
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or should know and which 
he realizes or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious 
bodily harm to such children, and 
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize 
the risk involved in intermeddling in it or coming within the area made danger- 
ous by it, and 
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is slight as com- 
pared to the risk to the young children involved therein. 
32See PROSSER 5 59, at 366; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 8 339, comment a (1934); Tres- 
passing Children 447-50; Expanding Liability 142-43. 
33Trespassing Children 466-69; Artificial Bodies of Water 944. 
S 4 P ~ o s s ~ ~  5 59, at 368; Trespassing Children 449; Artificial Bodies of Water 945. 
35See note 31 supra; Artificial Bodies of Water 942,944. 
S6See RESTATEMENT OF ORTS 5 339, comment c (1934). 
37ArtiJicial Bodies of Water 943. 
3853 Cal. 2d 340,348 P.2d 98 (1959). 
In King v. Lennen a one-and-a-half-year-old child drowned in a neighbor's swimming 
pool. Under prior California case law there would have been no recovery because a 
water hazard was not an "attractive nuisance." Id. at 34244,348 P.2d at 99-100. 
391d. at 34445,348 P.2d at 100. 
There was some indication that California would not only apply the Restatement to 
artificial conditions, but to natural ones as well. Id. 
401d. 
41See, e.g., Zorn v. Bellrose, 22 Ill. App. 2d 331, 160 N.E.2d 685 (1959); Martinez v. 
Louis Lyster, General Contractor, Inc., 75 N.M. 639, 409 P.2d 493 (1965); Artificial 
Bodies of Water 947. 
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In Oregon, attractive nuisance law has generally followed the trend 
outlined above. For some time the courts struggled with the question 
of what constituted an attractive nuisance.42 Finally, in Pocholec v. 
G i ~ s t i n a , ~ ~  Oregon adopted a rule very similar to section 339 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts,44 and followed the California rule 
of King u. L e n n e ~ ~ . ~ ~  Later, in Bosin v. Oak Lodge Sanitary Dis- 
t r i ~ t , ~ ~  it adopted the new formulation of the rule set out in the 
Restatement (Second)P7 
With a trend toward a rule of general negligence in attractive 
nuisance and the abolition of exempt categories for artificial condi- 
tions, scholars have been urging that the natural condition exception 
be abolished also.48 They insist that the criteria of the Restatement 
(Second); requiring a showing that the child did not understand the 
condition49 and that the burden of removal on the landowner would 
not have been excessive,50 will protect every legitimate interest of 
the land0wner.5~ In a caveat to section 339 of the Restatement 
-- 
42See 33 ORE. L. REV. 233,234-35 (1954). 
43224 Or. 245,355 P.2d 1104 (1960). 
44244 Or. at 252, 355 P.2d at 1107-08. The court adopted Dean Prosser's refinements 
of RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 8 339. See Trespassing Children 469. Dean Prosser's formula- 
tion differs slightly from the rule finally adopted in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
8 339. One such difference is that the Restatement (Second) requires that the injury 
arise from an "artificial condition," and Dean Prosser's formulation requires only that 
the injury arise from a "condition." In arguing before the Oregon Supreme Court, 
plaintiffs counsel in Loney relied upon this word difference and the fact that the court 
had previously adopted Dean Prosser's formulation of the rule and not the Restate- 
ment's, in an attempt to persuade the court that attractive nuisance liability could 
extend to natural conditions under prior Oregon case law. Brief for Appellant at 6, 
Loney v. McPhillips, 268 Or. 378,521 P.2d 340 (1974). 
45Pocholec v. Giustina, 224 Or. at 2574 ,355  P.2d at 11 10-1 1. 
46251 Or. 554,447 P.2d 285 (1968). 
47Zd. at 558-59,447 P.2d at 287. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 339 provides the following: 
Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Trespassing Children 
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing 
thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if 
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or 
has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and 
(b) the condition is one which the possessor knows or has reason to know and 
which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or 
serious bodily harm to such children, and 
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize 
the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made 
dangerous by it, and 
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of 
eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children involved, 
and 
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or other- 
wise protect the children. 
48See note 2 supra. 
5 0 R ~ S ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 339, Comment n (1965). 
51See, e.g., Trespassing Children 446-47; Expanding Liability 150. See also 2 OKLA. L. 
REV. 537,539 (1949). 
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(Second), the authors refused to express an opinion on natural condi- 
tions because the case law indicates no liability for injuries resulting 
from them.52 But the authors explained that in the cases decided 
dealing with natural conditions, there would have been no liability 
even had the Restatement (Second) m a p p l i e d ,  because the chil- 
dren understood the hazard.53 They further explained that in the 
great majority of cases there would be no liability because the bur- 
den on the landowner of removing the hazard would be excessive. 54 
The Restatement (Second), therefore, left open the possibility of 
liability in a situation where the hazard could not be understood by 
the child and the burden of removal was light.55 
In refusing to extend liability to natural conditions in Loney v. 
McPhillz$s, the court did not rely upon the traditional arguments. 
Rather, the basis for the decision was a legislatively declared public 
policy of encouraging landowners to allow public access to their 
lands for outdoor recreational purposes. 56 This policy, hereinafter 
referred to as the free access policy, is embodied in an Oregon statute 
that relieves a landowner of liability to intruders coming onto his 
property for recreational purposes, unless the landowner is guilty of 
a "reckless failure to warn" of a hazardous condition.57 The protec- 
tion of the statute is available to owners of range land, agiri&ltural 
land, forest land, and land adjacent to the ocean.58 The court de- 
clared that extending liability under attractive nuisance to natural 
conditions would lead to the closure of private lands and would 
frustrate the policy behind the statute.59 




56268 Or. at 38448,521 P.2d at 343-44. 
5 7 0 ~ ~ .  REV. STAT. 55 105.665, 105.675 (1974). 
5 8 0 ~ ~ .  REV. STAT. 5 105.655(2) (1974). 
59268 Or. at 388,521 P.2d at 344. 
One wonders why the Oregon statute did not preclude liability in Loney without 
need to consider attractive nuisance liability for natural conditions. The statute pro- 
vides that: 
(1) An owner of land owes no duty of care to keep the land safe for entry or use 
by others for any recreational purpose or to give any warning of a dangerous condi- 
tion, use, structure or activity on the land to persons entering thereon for any such 
purpose. 
ORE. REV. STAT. 5 105.665(1) (1974). It  further provides that a person does not, by in- 
viting others to come onto his property for recreational purposes, "extend any as- 
surance that the land is safe for any purpose" or "confer upon such persons the legal 
status of an invitee or licensee." ORE. REV. STAT. 5 105.665(2) (a)-(b) (1974). Recrea- 
tional purposes, according to the Oregon statute, include sightseeing. ORE. REV. STAT. 
$ 105.655(4) (1974). No exception from the statute's grant of immunity is expressed for 
child intruders. The only exceptions expressed are for the landowner's "reckless failure 
to . . . warn of a hidden danger," or for his negligence to those from whom he receives 
compensation for allowing them to use his land. ORE. REV. STAT. 5 105.675 (1974). 
It  appears that the facts of the Loney case were within the statute. The land in- 
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Assuming the allegations of the complaint to be true, Loney u. 
McPhillips was a case where defendant could have been liable under 
section 339 had the condition been artificiaL60 The danger at high 
tide, created by the cove, was not easily recognizable by children, 
and the burden of alleviating it consisted of putting up a fence or 
warning sign.61 Further, an extension of liability to natural hazards 
in Loney would not have been without precedent in Oregon. Three 
Oregon decisions, Po~holec,6~ B ~ s i n , ~ ~  and Karoblis v. Liebert, 64 
categorically declared that Oregon would no longer classify condi- 
tions. Although these cases dealt with artificial conditions, they con- 
tained dicta upon which the court could have relied to extend 
attractive nuisance liability to  natural hazards. The court's refusal, 
therefore, to impose liability draws particular attention to the court's 
rationalization for that refusal: the effectuation of the free access 
policy. In addition, it should be noted that with growing urbaniza- 
tion and a resulting scarcity of wild lands available for outdoor 
recreation, the free access policy will undoubtedly be considered by 
a growing number of state legislatures and courts.65 
pp - - 
volved was beach land and would have fit the statutory limitation for land contiguous 
to the ocean. ORE. REV. STAT. 5 105.655(2) (1974). See ORE. REV. STAT. 5 390.650 (1974). 
The plaintiffs son was on the land for recreational purposes within the meaning of the 
statute, and as pointed out above, there was no exception for child trespassers. It would 
seem that plaintiff could only recover by proving defendant's "reckless failure to . . . 
warn" rather than negligence. Nevertheless, the court relied upon the public policy 
behind the statute and not the statute itself. See 268 Or. at 388,521 P.2d at 344. 
The reason for the court's reliance upon the policy of the statute and not the statute 
itself may have been a desire to avoid a particularly knotty problem that often arises 
with statutes such as the Oregon one here under consideration. Loney v. MePhillips 
was decided on a demurrer (268 Or. at 380, 521 P.2d at 341), and in a code pleading 
state, like Oregon, matters of affirmative defense cannot be raised on demurrer. See 
ORE. REV. STAT. $5 16.260, 16.290 (1974). When faced, therefore, with a statute like the 
Oregon statute, courts must decide whether the statute destroys the cause of action or 
merely provides an affirmative defense to it. See generally Ellis v. Black Diamond Coal 
Mining Co., 265 Ala. 264, 90 So. 2d 770 (1956). If the Oregon statute provides an af- 
firmative defense and does not destroy the cause of action, the statute could not have 
been raised on demurrer. The Oregon Court may have decided merely to apply the 
public policy behind the statute to avoid having to decide this issue. The question was 
nQt briefed by either party. 
60Because Loney was decided on demurrer (268 Or. at 380, 521 P.2d at 341), the 
truthfulness of the complaint was never judicially determined. 
61268 Or. at 380, 521 P.2d at 341. The facts in Loney are surprisingly similar to an 
example posited by Dean Prosser in his argument for extending liability to natural 
conditions: 
Suppose a beach, on which young children in the neighborhood habitually tres- 
pass, wade, and swim, with a hidden drop-off ten feet from shore. If it were an 
artificial beach, the owner would at least be required to put up a warning sign. 
Is he absolved from that responsibility by the fact that the beach has always been 
there, and he has not changed it? The prediction may be ventured that he is not. 
Trespassing Children 446-47 (footnotes omitted). 
62224 Or. at 2574,355 P.2d at 11 10-1 1. 
63251 Or. at 560,447 P.2d at 288. 
64263 Or. 64,69-70,501 P.2d 315,318 (1972). 
65Wisconsin has a statute similar to Oregon's which relieves landownen of liability to 
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In considering attractive nuisance liability in light of the free 
access policy, three questions are apparent. (1) Does the free access 
policy justify limiting liability under attractive nuisance to artificial 
conditions? (2) What limitations on the scope of the natural hazards 
exception does the free access policy suggest? (3)  To what standard 
of care should the landowner be held if, under the natural condition 
exception to  attractive nuisance liability, he has no duty to exercise 
reasonable care? 
A. Does the Free Access Policy Justify Denying Attractive Nuisance 
Liability for Natural Conditions? 
This case note does not attempt to suggest an ultimate answer to  
the above-stated question. The problem posed is too broad in scope 
and too colored by peculiar local or regional conditions to lend itself 
to a simple solution. A rational and sustainable conclusion can be 
reached in any given jurisdiction, however, only if several factors are 
considered. The first is the degree of closure of recreational lands 
that will result if owners thereof are subjected to liability for injuries 
caused by natural conditions. 
It seems inevitable that some closure of private lands will result 
from an extension of liability. It may be true, as many commentators 
argue, that attractive nuisance liability for natural hazards will not 
put much additional burden on the l a n d ~ w n e r . ~ ~  But the extent of 
closure will depend not upon what the additional burden actually is, 
but upon what the landowner's perception of his additional burden 
is. If the landowner is uncertain about the possible extent of his 
liability, or if he is afraid of possible law suits, he might be induced 
to close off his land. 
Estimating how much closure will occur is a more difficult task, 
and perhaps is one that can better be undertaken by legislative rather 
than judicial bodies. Nevertheless, whichever body is considering the 
question should consider the type of land that is useful for outdoor 
recreation. Much of the land so suited will be far removed from the 
population centers, and the frequency of child trespass, particularly 
without parental supervision, will be greatly reduced. Owners of 
intruders for recreational purposes. WIS. STAT. ANN. B 29.68 (1973). A consideration of 
the legislative history of the Wisconsin statute gives some indication of the growing 
demand for outdoor recreation areas. A group of forest land owners sent out circulars 
inviting hunters onto their property in an effort to reduce deer herds that were causing 
substantial tree damage. They soon became concerned, however, about the possible 
liability that could arise should any of the invited hunters be injured on their property. 
In an effort to forestall liability, the forest land owners influenced the Wisconsin Iegis- 
lature to consider the bill relieving them of liability to those entering their land for 
recreational purposes. Once it was introduced, however, the bill received support from 
sportsmen. Apparently the demand for outdoor recreation areas was great enough that 
sportsmen were willing to bear the risk of injury to induce private owners to keep their 
lands open. 1964 WIS. L. REV. 705,709,713. 
%ee, e.g., Loney v. McPhillips, 268 Or. at 389, 521 P.2d at 345 (dissenting opinion); 
Trespassing Children 446; 2 OKLA. L. REV. 537,539 (1949). 
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remote property will likely be much less afraid of attractive nuisance 
liability and hence much less inclined to close off their property. The 
greatest incidence of closure caused by the imposition of attractive 
nuisance liability will undoubtedly occur on property near cities. 
Much of this property will not be suited to outdoor recreation and 
its closure will not be detrimental to  the free access policy. 
Once it is determined that significant closure will occur from 
extending liability, there still remains the problem of weighing corn- 
peting social interests. On the one hand is the interest of society in 
the safety of the child; on the other, the interest in keeping lands 
suitable for outdoor recreation open in the face of growing urbaniza- 
tion and the resulting scarcity of such lands. In determining whether 
liability should be extended, factors such as the current and future 
availability of wild lands, the amount that is in state, federal, and 
private ownership, and the present and future demand for such lands 
should be considered. Also to be considered is the actual effect on 
child safety of a refusal to extend liability to natural conditions. If, as 
Dean Prosser argued, liability under section 339 would not arise in 
the great majority of cases for natural conditions and indeed would 
not have arisen in any of the reported natural condition cases before 
19 7 1 ,67 it appears that attractive nuisance liability for natural 
hazards would have, at best, a miniscule effect on child safety. In 
analyzing that effect, however, just as in analyzing the effect on 
closure, the landowner's anticipation of increased liability, and not 
just the actual increase, must be considered. If landowners anticipate 
a high risk of financial loss resulting from imposition of liability and 
take precautionary measures on their land to avert that loss, perhaps 
lands will become significantly safer for the child trespasser. 
B. What Limits on the Scope of the Natural Conditions Exception to 
Attractive Nuisance Liability Are Suggested b y .  the Free Access 
Policy ? 
If a state decides that the public interest in keeping outdoor 
recreation lands available justifies limiting attractive nuisance liability 
to artificial conditions, it is questionable whether that limitation 
should apply to all land in the state. In limiting the extent of a 
landowner's liability to trespassers on recreational lands, states have 
recognized that under certain circumstances it is in the public 
interest to encourage landowners to allow trespass to their property. 
But since the reason for encouraging the allowance of trespass is to 
provide more outdoor recreational areas, the limitations on liability 
should not apply to landowners whose lands are unsuitable for out- 
door recreation. For example, industrial or commercial property is 
not suitable for such purposes, and there can be no public interest in 
encouraging owners of such property to allow trespass for outdoor 
6 7 P ~ o s s ~ ~  3 59, at 367. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 339, comment P 
(1965); Trespassing Children 446. 
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sportsmen. The Oregon statute is limited in application to  owners of 
agricultural land, forest land, range land, and land adjacent to  the 
ocean.68 Yet, in applying the public policy behind the statute and 
refusing to extend liability to natural hazards, the Oregon court 
apparently included all landowners in the state.G9 Giving such pro- 
tection to all landowners to  encourage them to open their lands for 
recreational use, regardless of whether their lands are suitable for 
that use, hardly seems justified. The Oregon court should have 
granted a natural hazard exemption from attractive nuisance liability 
only to owners of recreational lands. The free access policy relied on 
by the court can sustain no broader an exemption. 
C. To What Standard of Care Should the Landowner Be Held ih 
Under the Natural Conditions Exception to  Attractive Nuisance 
Liability, He Has No Duty To Exercise Reasonable Care? 
If no natural condition exception is recognized, an owner of 
recreational properties will be held to a standard of reasonable care 
under the attractive nuisance doctrine. If, however, a court or legis- 
lature recognizes a natural condition exception, the question arises as 
to what standard of care the landowner will be held. One obvious 
alternative standard is found in the common law rule that a land- 
owner is liable only if he wilfully and wantonly injures a trespasser. 
The rigor of this standard is de minimus; liability could be imposed 
only in exceptional cases of extreme landowner misconduct. 
Another alternative standard-a standard higher than the common 
law standard yet lower than the reasonable care standard of the 
attractive nuisance doctrine-may exist. The Oregon statute would 
impose liability on the landowner for a "reckless failure" to guard 
against or warn of a dangerous condition.70 Whether this standard is 
different from the common law standard of "wilfully and wantonly" 
inflicting injury is uncertain. It appears, however, that the common 
law standard reached only the active negligence of the landowner, 
and would not reach a failure to warn, unless that failure were ex- 
treme. Imposing liability on the landowner for a reckless failure to 
warn would arguably, therefore, give more protection to  the child 
than the common law rule. 
Theoretically at least, any landowner liability, even the minimal 
liability of the common law rule or the Oregon statute, will induce 
some closure and will be inconsistent with the free access policy. As 
a practical matter, however, imposition of the common law rule or 
the higher Oregon standard will not likely result in much closure. A 
minimal standard of care, because more easily met, is not likely to 
6 8 0 ~ .  REV. STAT. 5 105.655(2) (1974). The Oregon legislature apparently recognized 
the problem referred to in the text and carefully limited the immunity to owners whose 
lands would most likely be suitable for outdoor recreation. 
69268 Or. at 387438,521 P.2d at 344. 
7 0 0 ~ .  REV. STAT. § 105.675 (1974). 
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create among landowners as much uncertainty about liability or fear 
of litigation. Free of these concerns, a landowner is not likely to take 
precautionary measures such as closure. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts requires a 
weighing of the risk of injury to the child against the utility of the 
condition to the landowner and the burden on him of removing it. 71 
Dean Prosser once suggested that not only the utility of the condi- 
tion to the landowner, but also its utility to society should be con- 
sidered.T2 The Oregon court, in refusing to extend attractive 
nuisance liability to natural conditions because of a public interest in 
keeping wild land open, in fact considered the utility of the condition 
to society. But the refusal to extend liability to natural hazards 
under attractive nuisance for the reason given by the court can only 
be justified for landowners whose land is suitable for outdoor 
recreation. 
Torts-MED1c~~ MALPRACTICE-S OURCES OF A P HYSICIAN~S STANDARD OF
CARE: THE MEDICAL PROFESSION OR THE COURTS-Helling v. Carey, 83  
Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974). 
In 1959, Barbara Helling consulted Thomas F. Carey and Robert 
C. Laughlin, medical doctors and partners specializing in the practice 
of ophthalmology, concerning myopia and was fitted with contact 
lenses. In September 1963, she contacted them again regarding irrita- 
tion to her eyes, and over the next 5 years further consultations took 
p1ace.l The doctors considered Mrs. Helling's visual problems to be 
solely related to complications with her contact lenses until they 
tested her eye pressure and field of vision in October 1968. As a 
result of these tests, the doctors discovered that Mrs. Helling, who 
was then 32 years of age, had glaucoma2 and that she had lost her 
peripheral vision and a significant portion of her central vision. Mrs. 
7 1 R ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 339, Comment n (1965). 
72 Trespassing Children 463. 
lThese additional consultations occurred in October 1963, February 1967, September 
1967, October 1967, May 1968, July 1968, August 1968, September 1968, and October 
1968. 
2Plaintiff was found to be suffering from primary open angle glaucoma, a condition in 
which the nourishing fluids of the eye are unable to escape and flow from the eye 
properly. This condition causes an increase in intraocular pressure which ultimately 
results in damage to the optic nerve and permanent and irreversible lms of vision. 83 
Wash. 2d at 515,519 P.2d at 981. 
